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 
Abstract— As a tool for network operators to recover network 
investment costs from network users as well as to provide 
forward-looking economic signals, distribution network pricing 
models are also expected to identify and recover investment costs 
related to maintaining network security. The existing models 
reflect network security by determining the maximum allowed 
contingency flow along each component through implementing 
deterministic contingency analysis. They fail to consider two 
reliability cost drivers: i) reliability levels of network components 
and, ii) interruption tolerance levels at different nodes.  
For the first time, this paper proposes a novel distribution 
network pricing model to reflect two key reliability cost drivers: 
i) the nodal unreliability tolerance mandated by security 
standards, which is linked to the customer size at the node and ii) 
the stochastic nature of component reliability that reflects 
differing failure rates of network components. By combining the 
two factors, the new reliability based pricing model is able to 
recognize the impact on network investment from network 
components’ reliability in addition to their distance and the 
degree of utilization. The concept is firstly demonstrated on three 
small networks: a single circuit system, a parallel-circuit system 
and a meshed system. The applicability of the new pricing 
approach to practical systems is then illustrated on a practical 
distribution network in the UK system.  
 
Index Terms-- Network pricing, reliability, unreliability 
tolerance, failure rate, mean time to repair, tolerable loss of load. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
HE deregulation in the power industry has significantly 
increased the competition and promoted the efficiency of 
the sector throughout the world. It has however also imposed 
great uncertainties on power network planning and operation. 
In the competitive environment, network operators have no 
control over the sizes and sites of potential network users, but 
can use economic incentives to influence their decision 
makings. The use-of-system (UoS) charges are one of the most 
important forms of incentives, which are the charges levied on 
generators, large industrial consumers, and suppliers for their 
use of the network [1-4]. It is desirable that the UoS pricing 
methodologies can recover the costs of network investment, 
operation, and maintenance from network users in a cost-
reflective way such that they are incentivized to choose the 
most economic sizes and locations so as to minimize network 
investment.   
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In line with network planning security standards [5-7], all 
networks are designed to be able to withstand credible 
contingencies that would affect the supply reliability. Table I 
gives part of the UK distribution network planning standards, 
Engineering Recommendation P2/6 [6], outlining the required 
security levels against differing sizes of demand groups. As 
shown by the table, the planning standards require smaller user 
groups to be secured against N-1 contingencies and larger 
groups against N-2 or even high orders of contingencies. In 
addition, the standards also specify the allowed interruption 
durations and amounts for each customer group, but it is still 
based deterministic criteria, assuming all components having 
the same probability of failure rate.  
 
TABLE I 
PART OF THE ENGINEERING RECOMMENDATION P2/6 IN THE UK [6] 
Class Group   First circuit outage Second circuit outage 
A ≤1MW 
In repair time: group 
demand 
Nil 
B 
≤1MW 
≤12MW 
(a) within 3 hours: group 
minus 1MW 
(b) In repair time: group  
Nil 
C 
≤12MW 
≤60MW 
(a) within 15 minutes: 
smaller of (group minus 
12MW); and 2/3of group  
(b) within 3 hours: group 
Nil 
D 
≤60MW 
≤300MW 
(a) immediately: group 
minus up to 12 MW  
(b) within 3 hours: group  
(c) within 3 hours:  for 
group greater than 
100MW: smaller of 
(group minus 100MW); 
and 1/3 group  
(d) within time to 
restore arranged outage: 
group  
… … … … 
 
Due to aging, human misoperation, bad weather, or 
intentional attacks, all components are not 100% reliable and 
they would fail at certain rates according to historic experience 
[8]. Maintaining a certain level of network reliability is crucial 
to both customers and operators. For customers, they might 
suffer huge monetary loss due to supply interruption, and for 
operators, they would be penalized by regulators for not 
providing the mandated reliability levels. Basically, there are 
two ways to improve network security: i) to restore the failed 
components in shorter time; ii) to ensure sufficient 
redundancies in systems such that when some components fail, 
the supply will not be interrupted. It is usually neither possible 
nor economical to guarantee  100% reliability due to the high 
operation and investment costs [9]. That is why security 
standards usually allow a certain level of load interruption for 
a period of time for particular customer groups [6].  
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Network pricing as a means to recover the investment costs 
from network users should also reflect users’ contribution to 
the costs needed in maintaining an appropriate level of 
reliability or security of supply [10-14]. Substantial research 
has been conducted on pricing with network security/reliability, 
but the majority of the work focuses on allocating the 
embedded network cost in transmission systems [15-18]. 
These approaches allocate the embedded costs based on 
marginal reliability margin and capacity share between normal 
and abnormal conditions. None of them can reflect the costs of 
future reinforcement and consequently are unable to influence 
the locations and sizes of the future generation and demand. 
Another disadvantage associated with the transmission 
charging approaches is that they do not consider differing 
interruption tolerance for customers. 
The charging methodologies at the distribution level are 
less advanced. Prior to 2007, there was no locational 
distribution charging methodologies and the fixed costs are 
allocated based on yardstick approaches with differing 
sophistication [19, 20]. The increasing distributed generators 
(DG) need locational signals at the distribution level to guide 
their sizes and sites [21]. The UK is the first country 
introducing locational network charges at the distribution level. 
The Long-run Incremental Cost (LRIC)-  utilized at its Extra 
High Voltage (EHV) distribution networks seeks to reflect the 
impact on future investment in networks as a result of a 
generation injection or a load withdrawal at each study node 
[22, 23]. The model also considers network security when 
identifying reinforcement costs and calculating charges [24]. It 
assigns each component with a contingency factor, defined as 
the ratio of the component’s maximum contingency flow under 
N-1 or N-2 contingencies over its normal flow and the 
component available capacity is then scaled down accordingly 
with the factor [10]. The maximum contingency flow is the 
flow along a component under its most serious contingency; 
the most serious contingency is the contingency event that 
gives rise to the largest increase in the component’s power 
flow. The other charging model used at EHV distribution 
networks - Forward Cost Pricing (FCP) - runs network 
contingency analysis to determine the volume of components’ 
rated capacity needed to be reserved for the worst contingency 
events [24, 25]. The two approaches are still based on two 
assumptions: i) all components have the same failure rates and, 
ii) all nodes connected with customers have no supply 
interruption allowance. These assumptions overestimate the 
impacts of network security on long-term investment and 
generate less cost-reflective network charges.  
 A novel network pricing model for higher voltage 
distribution networks is proposed to integrate the stochastic 
features of component reliability and allowed nodal supply 
interruptions. Due to the complexity of reliability calculation 
[26, 27], it is very hard to directly include it in network 
charging. An alternative method is to use analytical 
approaches to simplify the calculations [28, 29]. Firstly, the 
allowed nodal load loss and the allowed interruption duration 
are combined together to form nodal Expected Energy Not 
Supply (EENS) to reflect the nodal tolerance to supply 
interruptions. Then, the calculated EENS together with a 
component’s Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) and annual 
Failure Rate (FR) are used to form the nodal tolerable loss of 
load (TLoL). The new method curtails the nodal TLoL 
supported by each component when determining its maximum 
flow in contingencies that define its future reinforcement. The 
flow is then translated into its reinforcement horizon and the 
impacts of nodal injections or withdraws are reflected by 
recognizing the change in the component reinforcement 
horizon. The model is able to recognize the impact on network 
investment from customer unreliability allowance and 
components reliability levels. The proposed model is 
demonstrated on a two-busbar notional network and an actual 
distribution system taken from the U.K. network. Sensitivity 
analysis is also conducted to investigate the impacts of 
component reliability and nodal unreliability tolerance on the 
nodal charges. 
The rest of this paper is organized as: Section II introduces 
the deterministic and reliability based network reinforcement 
methodologies. In section III, the impact of network reliability 
on component reinforcement horizons in three typical 
networks are studied. Section IV introduces the normal case 
reinforcement horizon calculation and section V reports the 
framework of the proposed model. Sections VI and VII 
employ two systems to demonstrate the proposed method. 
Section VIII presents a short discussion of using commercial 
reliability package to facilitate the application of the proposed 
approach. Section IX concludes this paper. 
II.  DETERMINISTIC AND RELIABILITY-BASED NETWORK 
REINFORCEMENT  
Methodologies used for identifying future investment costs 
in a network charging model can be generally divided into two 
categories: deterministic criteria based and reliability based. 
The deterministic approaches reinforce a network when it can 
no longer securely supply its demand under network 
contingencies as required by security standards. By contrast, 
the reliability based planning reinforces a network when the 
required reliability level at the customer end is violated as a 
result of demand/generation growth.  
The comparison of the two types of principles is carried out 
on the notional two-busbar system given in Fig.1, where a 
demand group P is supported by two identical circuits.  
 
Bus1 Bus2
L1
L2 P  
Fig.1. Two-circuit radial network. 
A.  Deterministic Approach 
Suppose that the security standards require that the demand 
group should be secured against N-1 contingencies.  When L1 
fails, L2 is sufficient as long as it can still accommodate the 
demand group, but should be reinforced immediately if it is 
unable to do so. Therefore, the time taking the initial demand 
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to grow to L2’s full capacity is given by 
 nrPRC  10          (1) 
where RC is L2’s rated capacity, P0 is the initial demand size, r 
is the chosen load growth rate and n is L2’s reinforcement  
time horizon. 
B.  Reliability-based Approach 
The reliability-based approaches acknowledge that it is 
neither possible nor economical for network operators to 
guarantee 100% supply reliability, but a certain degree of 
supply interruption at a node, i.e. nodal EENS, is acceptable. 
This nodal allowance will in turn allow circuits, which support 
the nodal demand, to have some degree of tolerable power 
curtailment. The level of the tolerance is dictated by the failed 
component’s failure rate and MTTR and the nodal EENS. By 
combining the three factors, the nodal EENS is translated into 
branch tolerable loss of load of the working components, i.e. 
the flow along them that can be curtailed when the other 
components fail, given by  
FRMTTR
EENS
TLoL

          (2) 
where, EENS is the product of the amount of load can be 
interrupted at a node and its duration. MTTR and FR are the 
failed component’s mean time to repair and failure rate. 
This formula translates nodal unreliability tolerance and 
component reliability into the level of load that can be 
interrupted during network contingencies. Smaller MTTR 
indicates that it takes less time to restore the failed component,  
and thus for a given EENS tolerance, the working circuit could 
withstand larger load loss and give rise to larger TLoL. The 
same goes to FR.  
The reliability based planning reinforces the network when 
the TLoL at a busbar overtakes the tolerable threshold 
specified in security standards. In Fig.1, L2’s reinforcement 
horizon is thereby derived with (3) when L1 fails. 
  RCrPTLoL n  10       (3) 
where, TLoL is the tolerable loss of load at busbar 2 
determined by its allowed EENS and L1’s MTTR and FR.  
C.  The Difference  
The difference between the two approaches can be shown 
by comparing (1) and (3). The difference is that (3) includes 
the nodal TLoL in determining component reinforcement 
horizons, but (1) does not. Equation (1) is to gauge the time 
taking the demand to grow to L2’s capacity when L1 fails, it is 
based on two assumptions: i) L1’s failure rate is 1, i.e. it 
definitely fails at some point in the studied period; ii) no load 
loss is tolerable at busbar 2. By contrast, (3) integrates the 
reliability of L1 and the tolerable nodal load loss, and allows 
that part of load curtailed when determining L2’s 
reinforcement horizon. Therefore, it can better reflect the 
actual network planning practice. As there will be additional 
TLoL in a component, the reinforcement time horizon from the 
reliability based approach is always bigger than that from 
deterministic based approach. The magnitude of the difference 
depends on three factors: the nodal EENS, the failed 
component’s MTTR and FR. 
III.  COMPONENT REINFORCEMENT IN CONTINGENCIES  
This section calculates component investment horizons with 
the inclusion of component reliability and nodal unreliability 
tolerance for three typical networks: a single-circuit network, a 
parallel-circuit network, and a meshed network in two 
scenarios: with and without a nodal demand increment.  
A.  Single-circuit Case  
For the single-circuit network given in Fig. 2, the tolerable 
supply interruption at busbar 2 is assumed to be EENS0.  
 
Bus1 Bus2
L1
P0  
Fig.2. A single-circuit network. 
 
The outage of L1 will interrupt the total demand P0 at 
busbar 2, but if  P0 is smaller than the threshold size specified 
in security standards required for N-1 contingency security 
level there is no need to reinforce L1 (for purpose of 
demonstration, the case that L1 is under repair or maintenance 
is not considered). As P0 grows at a given rate, the demand 
group size will reach the threshold at some point in the future   
and by that time L1 should be reinforced. The time taking P0 
to grow to the threshold is identified with   
 nrPTLoL  10           (4) 
This formula can be rewritten by submitting (2) into it  
 nrP
FRMTTR
EENS


10
11
0         (5) 
where, MTTR1 and FR1 are L1’s MTTR and FR, and r is the 
predicted load growth rate  
Rearranging and taking logarithm of (5) produces (6), 
which is L1’s reinforcement horizon without any injections. 
 
 r
P
FRMTTR
EENS
n









1log
loglog 0
11
0
       (6) 
A demand increment at busbar 2 increases the load loss 
when L1 fails and consequently it brings forward the circuit’s 
reinforcement horizon. If the nodal unreliability tolerance level 
is to be maintained, i.e. EENS0 is the same before and after the 
nodal increment, the new horizon can be determined by 
    newnrPP
FRMTTR
EENS


10
11
0      (7) 
where, P  is the extra flow along L1 due to the increment. 
Rearranging it produces 
 
 r
PP
FRMTTR
EENS
nnew









1log
loglog 0
11
0
     (8) 
B.  Parallel-circuit Case 
For the two parallel–circuit network given in Fig.1, it is 
assumed that the two circuits are identical. The reliability 
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based approach is demonstrated on L1’s reinforcement 
calculation. Suppose that L2’s MTTR is MTTR2, FR is FR2 
and rated capacity is RC2, and the nodal tolerable EESN is 
EENS0. If L2 fails, L1’s reinforcement is triggered when the 
demand grows to a level that exceeds the branch loss of load 
tolerance. Based on the analysis in Section II, L1’s investment 
horizon can be calculated by submitting (2) into (3) and taking 
logarithm of it, producing  
 
 r
PRC
FRMTTR
EENS
n










1log
loglog 0
22
0
     (9) 
When a new injection comes to busbar 2, L1’s new 
investment horizon can be calculated by replacing P0 in (9) 
with (P0+ ΔP) 
 
 r
PPRC
FRMTTR
EENS
nnew










1log
loglog 0
22
0
  (10) 
where, ΔP is the extra contingency flow along L1 due to the 
injection when L2 fails. 
L2’s reinforcement horizons with and without an injection 
can be calculated in the same way.  
C.  Meshed Network Case  
For a simple meshed network in Fig.3, it is assumed that if 
L1 fails, it will cause the maximum contingency flow along L2 
and L3, i.e., their future reinforcement requirement is defined 
by the demand increase when L1 fails. The tolerable EENS at 
busbars 2 and 3 are EENS1 and EENS2 respectively 
 
Bus1
Bus3
L2
P2
Bus2
L1
P1
L3
 
Fig.3. A simple meshed network. 
 
Similar to the previous two cases, L2’s reinforcement 
horizon in the contingency event is determined by the time 
taking the circuit power flow to grow from the current level to 
its rated capacity plus the amount TLoL that could be curtailed 
at busbars 2 and 3, given by 
    22121 1 RCrPPTLoLTLoL
n
    (11) 
where, P1 and P2 are the demand at busbars 2 and 3, TLoL1 
and TLoL2 are their respective loss of load tolerance, and RC2 
is L2’s rated capacity. 
Rearranging (11) and submitting (2) into it produces  
 
 r
PP
FRMTTR
EENSEENS
RC
n











1log
loglog 21
11
21
2
  (12) 
When a load increment is experienced at either bus 2 or bus 
3, it will change L2’s investment horizon. The new investment 
horizon can be obtained by replacing (P1+ P2) in (12) with 
(P1+P2 + ΔP) 
 
 r
PPP
FRMTTR
EENSEENS
RC
nnew











1log
loglog 21
11
21
2
(13) 
where, ΔP is L2’s power flow increment due to the nodal 
injection when L1 fails. 
L3’s reinforcement horizon can be identified in the same 
way as L2, given by  
  311 1 RCrPTLOL
n
        (14) 
Rearranging it gives  
 
 r
PRC
FRMTTR
EENS
n










1log
loglog 13
11
1
     (15) 
Similarly, its new reinforcement horizon with an injection at 
busbar 2 is  
 
 r
PPRC
FRMTTR
EENS
nnew










1log
loglog 13
11
1
    (16) 
Where, ΔP is L3’s power flow increment when L1 fails.  
It should be pointed out that the TLoL that can be curtailed 
during network contingencies in determining a component’s 
reinforcement horizon is the sum of all the nodal tolerable load 
loss the component supports. For example, in this meshed 
network, the total curtailed TLoL in calculating L2’s horizon 
is the sum of the tolerable nodal load loss at busbars 2 and 3. 
IV.  COMPONENT REINFORCEMENT UNDER NORMAL 
CONDITIONS 
Component’s reinforcement can be triggered by demand 
growth in either normal or contingency conditions; the smaller 
one in the two conditions defines the actual horizon. Similar to 
(1), under normal conditions the reinforcement horizon of a 
component without any injections is  
   
 r
PRC
n l



1log
loglog          (17) 
where, RC is the component’s rated capacity and P1 is its 
normal case flow.  
Its new reinforcement horizon with an injection can be 
obtained by replacing P1 in (17) with (P1+ΔP)  
   
 r
PPRC
n lnew



1log
loglog         (18) 
where, ΔP is the circuit’s incremental power flow under the 
normal conditions.  
V.  FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW NETWORK PRICING  
The core of the new charging model is to: i) determine the 
impact of nodal power perturbation on components’ 
reinforcement horizons when considering the two key 
reliability cost drivers, and ii) translate the impact into the 
change in the present value of components’ future 
reinforcement. The implementation steps of the new model are 
summarized as follows. 
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A.  Branch Tolerable Load Loss and Maximum Contingency 
Flow 
The prerequisite task of analyzing nodal injection on 
network components is: i) to investigate how nodal TLoL 
affects branches’ flows, defined as branch TLoL, and ii) the 
maximum contingency flow along each component with the 
branch TLoL curtailed. In each contingency, power flow is 
first executed and then sensitivity analysis is used to determine 
the relationship between nodal injections and branch flows, i.e. 
how a nodal increment would affect branch flows [12]. It is 
therefore possible to determine components’ flows with the 
nodal TLoL at each busbar curtailed. By repeating this in all 
contingency events, the maximum contingency flows along 
components can bee determined  
If a network component fails, the associated nodal TLoL 
can be calculated with (2), where MTTR and FR are the failed 
component’s reliability parameters. The tolerable nodal EENS 
is obtained by multiplying nodal tolerable load loss with the 
allowed outage duration. If more than one component fails 
simultaneously or one component fails when the other is under 
maintenance, the equivalent MTTR and FR should be 
calculated by combining the reliability parameters of  the all 
out of service components using reliability theory [8]. 
B.  Component’s Original Horizon without Injections 
Components’ original horizons under normal case are 
determined by: i) running power flow analysis to calculate 
components’ power flows; ii) feeding the obtained results into 
(7) to determine the investment horizons. The maximum 
contingency flows of all components calculated in step (A) are 
submitted into (6), (9), (12), or (15), according to the network 
configurations, to calculate their contingency case 
reinforcement horizons. The smaller values from the normal 
and contingency cases are chosen as their actual original 
reinforcement horizons. 
C.  Component’s New Horizon with Injections 
Add an injection at each study busbar and then run power 
flow analysis to calculate components’ new reinforcement 
horizons under normal case with (18). Under network 
contingency, a nodal injection is applied to every studied 
busbar to run contingency analysis to calculate all 
components’ maximum contingency flows. Then, since we 
have determined the correlation between components’ flows 
and the nodal injections in each contingency in step (A), it is 
therefore easy to determine their new maximum contingency 
flows with the nodal TLoL curtailed. The new maximum 
contingency branch flows are then fed into (8), (10), (13) or 
(16) to determine their new reinforcement horizons. Similar to 
Step (B), the smaller time horizons are chosen as their actual 
reinforcement horizons. 
D.  Unit Price  
When the original and new reinforcement horizons of a 
component are identified, its unit incremental cost for each 
study busbar can be assessed by calculating the changes in its 
present value of future reinforcement. The present value of the 
future reinforcement of the component is 
 nd
Cost
PV


1
         (19) 
where, d is discount rate and n is its original investment 
horizon obtained in Step (B) and Cost is its investment cost. 
The change in the present value of future investment as a 
result of an injection is  
    











nn
dd
CostPV
new 1
1
1
1      (20) 
where, nnew is the component new reinforcement horizon 
determined in Step (C),  
The incremental cost of the component is the annuitized 
change in the present value of future investment 
torAnnuityFacPVIC         (21) 
The nodal incremental cost for a node is the accumulation 
of the incremental costs over all components supporting the 
node over the size of the nodal injection  
PI
IC
LRIC


           (22) 
where, PI is the size of the nodal injection. 
E.  Flowchart 
The proposed network pricing is also shown in the 
flowchart in Fig.4, illustrating how to take into account the two 
reliability cost drivers in a network pricing model.  
 
 
Fig.4. Flowchart of the proposed method 
 
The proposed method respects both component reliability 
(in terms of failure rate and mean time to repair) and nodal 
tolerable supply interruption (in terms of allowed nodal load 
loss and the allowed duration) when determining components 
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reinforcement horizons. Although the concept is demonstrated 
on notional systems, it can be equally applied to large-scale 
practical systems following the steps given above and shown 
in Fig.4. The underlying reliability information and security 
analyses can be processed by any professional software, such 
as PSS/E [30]. The approach does need additional information 
in addition to basic network information, such as line and 
transform impedance and costs. Besides, utilities need to 
supply their components’ reliability information and suppliers 
need to supply their customer sizes. In Section VII, we will 
demonstrate our approach on an actual distribution system area 
from the UK network.   
VI.  DEMONSTRATION ON A SMALL SYSTEM WITH DC FLOW 
In this section, the proposed approach is demonstrated and 
compared with the original LRIC model on the simple network 
given in Fig.3, using DC load flow. D1 and D2 are assumed to 
be 10 MW and 20MW respectively, each with a growth rate of 
1.0%. For simplicity purposes, the three circuits are assumed 
to be identical, and their parameters are presented in Table II. 
 
TABLE II  
CIRCUIT PARAMETERS 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Cost (£) 
MTTR 
(hour/time) 
FR 
(hour/year) 
Failure 
period 
(hour/year) 
45  1,596,700 7.5 0.5 3.75 
 
According to P2/6, the allowed nodal load loss is supposed 
to be 1MW within 3 hours for busbar 1 and 3MW within 3 
hours for busbar 2, which produces a tolerable EENS of 
3MWh at busbar 1 and 9MWh at busbar 2.  
A.  Charge Calculation  
Table III outlines the base case states of the three circuits.  
 
 TABLE III  
RESULTS OF THE THREE–BUSBAR SYSTEM 
Circuit No. L1 L2 L3 
Normal power flow (MW) 13.33 16.67 3.33 
Maximum contingency flow (MW) 30 30 20 
Contingency factor 2.25 1.8 6.0 
The most serious contingency event  L2 out L1 out L2 out 
 
As seen, the maximum contingency flows along L1 and L3 
are caused by L2’s failure and L2’s maximum contingency 
flow appears when L1 fails. By comparing the normal and 
contingency cases, it is noted that the three circuits’ 
reinforcement is triggered by the demand growth in 
contingency situations. When L2 fails, the sensitivity at busbar 
2 to the flow along L1 and the sensitivity at busbar 3 to the 
flows along L1 and L3 are all 1.0, i.e. 1MW nodal injection at 
each busbar will cause 1 MW flow increment along the circuits.     
For assisting understanding, we take the case of calculating 
the nodal charge for busbar 3 as an example. When no 
injection is connected to the busbar, the three circuits’ 
maximum flows are 30MW, 30MW and 20MW respectively, 
as given in Table III. The TLoL at the two busbars is 
calculated by dividing 3MWh and 9MWh with the product of 
MTTR (7.5h/time) and FR (0.5time/ry), producing 0.8MW 
and 2.4MW respectively. Since, the sensitivity is 1.0, the 
reduction demand of 0.8MW and 2.4MW will cause the same 
branch reduction in the same amount. By feeding these results 
into (12) or (15), we obtain the three circuits’ reinforcement 
horizons, which are 47.65yrs, 47.65yrs and 88.40yrs 
respectively shown in Table IV. 
When 1MW injection is applied to busbar 3, the three 
circuits’ maximum flows are still driven by the failures of L2 
L1 and L2 respectively, but the values become to 31MW, 
31MW and 21MW. When the nodal TLoL is curtailed, we can 
therefore calculate their new reinforcement horizons with (13) 
or (16), which produces 44.36yrs for L1, 44.36yrs for L2 and 
83.50yrs for L3. By submitting their old and new 
reinforcement horizons into (20), we can easily determine the 
incremental costs from the three circuits for the customer at 
busbar 3 given in Table V. The summation of the three 
incremental costs divided by the injection size is the actual 
incremental charge for busbar 3, which is 2548.05£/MW/yr. 
 
TABLE IV  
HORIZONS OF THE THREE CIRCUITS IN CONTINGENCIES (YR) 
Injection location L1 L2 L3 
No injection 47.65 47.65 88.40 
Bus 2 44.36 44.36 88.40 
Bus 3 44.36 44.36 83.50 
 
TABLE V 
RESULTS OF THE THREE-BUSBAR SYSTEM (£/MW/YR) 
 
Cost from 
L1 
Cost from  
L2 
Cost from  
L3 
Total 
charge 
Bus 2 1211.17 1211.17 0.00 2422.34 
Bus 3 1211.17 1211.17 125.70 2548.05 
 
Similarly, when an injection is applied to busbar 2, the 
reinforcement horizons of the three circuits and consequently 
the incremental costs can be calculated in the same way. The 
results are given in Table IV and Table V respectively. The 
final charge is 2422.34£/MW/yr for busbar 2. 
B.  Comparison with the Original LRIC Model 
The original LRIC model [11] also accounts for supply 
security but in a rather simplistic approach. It assumes all 
circuits having the same MTTR and FR, and the nodal 
tolerance to supply interruption is zero. As such, it restricts the 
amount of flow through the circuits under the normal 
condition. The maximum allowed power flow for a circuit 
under contingency condition is determined by reshaping their 
rated capacity with their contingency factors given in Table 
III. As a result, the maximum allowed power flows along L1, 
L2 and L3 under the normal condition are 20MW, 25MW and 
7.5MW respectively despite that the three circuits have an 
identical rated capacity. Table VI provides their reinforcement 
horizons calculated with and without injections on the basis of 
the maximum allowed capacity. 
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Table VI  
REINFORCEMENT HORIZONS OF THE THREE CIRCUITS WITHOUT EENS 
TOLERANCE (YR) 
Injection location L1 L2 L3 
No injection 40.75 40.75 81.50 
Bus 2 35.85 38.76 92.09 
Bus 3 38.27 36.81 71.92 
 
Compared with the results from the proposed approach in 
Table IV, most future investment horizons are reduced, 
implying the investments required come earlier. This is 
because the original LRIC does not consider circuits’ 
reliability level but assumes they will fail at some point over 
the year, nor the TLoL at each load busbar. One exception is 
that when an injection is connected to busbar 2, L3’s 
investment horizon is deferred to 92.09 yrs, as the injection 
reduces its flow.  
 
TABLE VII 
RESULTS OF THE THREE-BUSBAR SYSTEM (£/MW/YR) 
 
Cost from 
L1 
Cost from  
L2 
Cost from  
L3 
Total 
charge 
Bus 2 3019.59 1108.24 -260.76 3867.07 
Bus 3 1404.94 2347.28 460.41 4212.63 
 
Table VII outlines the incremental cost of each component 
and the final charges for each node. As seen, most incremental 
costs are higher than those from the proposed approach in 
Table VI. One exception is that an injection at busbar 2 can 
gain a reward of £260.76MW/yr for using L3. Actually, the 
injection has no impact on L3’s future reinforcement, as the 
injection has no impact on its maximum contingency flow, so 
it should not be rewarded. The proposed model can capture 
this point, generating no reward for users at busbar 2 for using 
L3. The final charges are 3.67.07£/MW/yr for busbar 2 and 
4212.63£/MW/yr for busbar 3; both are bigger than those from 
the proposed model.   
VII.  DEMONSTRATION ON A PRACTICAL NETWORK  
This section carries out the comparison of the two 
approaches on a practical Grid Supply Point (GSP) area taken 
from the UK network depicted in Fig.5.  
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Fig. 5. A Grid Supply Point (GSP) area test system.  
 
The discount rate and load growth rate are chosen as 6.9% 
and 1.0% respectively. For the purpose of simplicity and ease 
in explanation, all branches are supposed to have the same 
repair time of 4 hour/time and failure rate of 0.5time/year. The 
combination of the two factors produces a failure period of 2 
hour/year. For each component, as the MTTR and FR have the 
same effect on the TLoL according to (2), the following 
analysis only focuses on the impact incurred by FR. 
Table VIII outlines all load busbars’ allowed load loss and 
the calculated tolerable EENS. Busbar 1001 has the smallest 
EENS of 3.5MWh. Busbar 1003’s EENS is the biggest, 
4.5MWh, followed by other four busbars that have the same 
EENS. The EENS combined with the MTTR and FR of a 
failed component is utilized to calculate the nodal TLoL in 
each network contingency. 
 
TABLE VIII 
NODAL RELIABILITY INDICES 
Busbar 1001 1003 1006 1007 1009 1013 
Allowed nodal 
load loss (MW) 
7.0 9.0 2.0 8.0 2.0 2.0 
Duration (hour) 0.5 0.5 2.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 
EENS (MWh) 3.5 4.5 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 
A.  Low Utilization Level Case  
This part carries out the calculations at system base loading 
level in three different scenarios, in which the GSP area is 
assumed to have different reliability levels:  
 Scenario 1: use base nodal reliability level in Table VIII; 
 Scenario 2: increase nodal reliability level by decreasing 
nodal allowed load loss down to the half of the original 
values, causing the nodal tolerable EENS and TLoL halved;  
 Scenario 3: increase nodal reliability levels by decreasing 
assets’ FRs to the half of the original values, causing the 
TLoL doubled. 
Table IX provides the calculated nodal charges under the 
three scenarios as well as those from the original LRIC model. 
Compared with scenarios 1 and 3, scenario 2 produces the 
highest charges for all 6 load busbars: the highest charge is 
25.74£/kW/yr at busbar 1003 and the lowest is 0.21£/kW/yr at 
busbar 1009. This is because lower allowed load loss means 
that less demand can be interrupted in contingencies and hence 
more asset spare capacity should be reserved to accommodate 
the potential extra contingency flows and thus reduces asset 
maximum available capacity. Scenario 3 produces the lowest 
charges in all scenarios, as smaller asset FR indicates that they 
are less likely to fail and therefore for a given EENS level, less 
spare capacity needs to be reserved for contingencies.  
 
TABLE IX 
NODAL CHARGE COMPARISON IN FOUR SCENARIOS (£/KW/YR) 
Busbar 1001 1003 1006 1007 1009 1013 
Scenario 1: 
base case 
4.08 20.22 16.66 1.46 0.18 0.91 
Scenario 2: 
lower LoL 
4.90 25.74 21.29 1.79 0.21 1.26 
Scenario3: 
smaller FR 
2.88 12.80 10.46 0.98 0.13 0.50 
Original 
approach 
5.59 32.59 26.80 2.14 0.24 1.71 
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Although both scenarios 2 and 3 have improved nodal 
reliability levels, the calculated charges vary greatly. The 
reason is that scenario 2 produces smaller TLoL, but in 
scenario 3, the TLoL is enlarged because component FR is 
reduced. By contrast, the original LRIC model generates the 
highest charges for all load busbars, as it assumes that 
component’s rated capacity is reduced by the contingency 
factors and thus a tiny injection would dramatically bring 
forward the investment. The highest charge also appears at 
busbar 1003, counted as 32.59£/kW/yr, and the lowest is 0.24 
£/kW/yr for busbar 1009.  
From another aspect, the charges from the proposed 
approach in all three scenarios maintain the relativity pattern 
from the original model: bus 1003’s charge is the highest, 
followed by bus 1006 and the charge at bus 1013 is the lowest. 
B.  High Utilization Level Case  
In this part, the comparison is carried out in the same three 
scenarios previously utilized but with higher component 
utilization levels. The calculated results are given in Table X.  
 
TABLE X 
NODAL CHARGE COMPARISON (£/KW/YR) 
Busbar 1001 1003 1006 1007 1009 1013 
Scenario 1: 
base case 
8.44 41.99 34.08 2.95 0.41 1.85 
Scenario 2: 
lower LoL 
10.13 53.45 43.56 3.62 0.49 2.56 
Scenario3: 
smaller FR 
5.96 26.59 21.40 1.99 0.29 1.01 
Original 
approach 
11.53 67.70 54.95 4.28 0.52 3.49 
 
 Compared with results in Table IX, charges for all studied 
busbars here grow dramatically. Particularly, the highest 
charge is found as 67.70£/kW/yr at busbar 1003 from the 
original model, followed by 53.45£/kW/yr generated by 
scenario 3. The high charges are due to the increased 
component loading levels, which greatly bring forward their 
reinforcement horizons. On the other hand, the relative sizes in 
charges are still maintained as observed. 
C.  Impact of TLoL and FR 
This part investigates the influence of two major factors 
that affect nodal charges: nodal unreliability tolerance and 
asset FR on the nodal charges. For simplicity purposes, only 
busbar 1003 is analyzed. 
Fig.6 demonstrates the charge at busbar 1003, varying with 
respect to the decrease in its nodal unreliability tolerance, i.e. 
the amount of allowed load loss. The results from the proposed 
model are depicted with the solid line and those produced by 
the original model are represented by the dashed line. As seen, 
when the allowed load loss is around 30% of the load at busbar 
1003, the charge from the new model is about 25.5£/kW/yr, 
which increases gradually with the decline in the tolerance. It 
reaches approximately 33£/kW/yr when the allowed load loss 
is zero. The charge from the original model, by contrast, 
persists at 32.59£/kW/yr, as it does not consider any nodal 
TLoL. 
25
27
29
31
33
35
30 27 24 21 18 15 12 9 6 3 0
Proportion of LoL (%)
C
h
a
rg
e
 (
£
/k
W
/y
r)
Proposed approach
Original approach
 
Fig.6. Charge variation with respect to the allowed LoL. 
 
It is noted that when the allowed load loss percentage is 
close to zero, the two lines cross at a point, and beyond it, the 
charge from the proposed model exceeds that from the original 
model. It is because the original model considers that an 
injection at 1003 can defer L5’s investment horizon and 
therefore it produces a reward for busbar 1003 for using L5. 
By contrast, the proposed model produces no incremental cost 
or reward for the busbar from L5. 
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Fig.7. Charge variation with respect to failure rate. 
 
In Fig.7, the impact of component reliability on busbar 
1003’s charge is presented. Obviously, the charge from the 
new model decreases gradually with the decline in 1003’s 
supporting components’ FRs. When they are 1.0time/yr, the 
charge is approximately 25£/kW/yr, which decreases steadily 
to merely about 4£/kW/yr when the FRs are 0.1time/yr. The 
reason is that when the FRs are small, the components rarely 
fail and hence less of their capacity needs to be reserved for 
catering for contingencies. In the extreme cases that all 
components’ failure rates are zero, i.e. they never fail, there is 
no need to reserve component capacity to accommodate 
contingency. Under such context, the charges only depend on 
components’ rated capacity, load growth rate, and system 
loading conditions. 
As demonstrated, nodal charges are brought down by 
considering nodal unreliability tolerance and component 
reliability, the degree of which depends on the allowed load 
loss size and component reliability levels. Bigger unreliability 
tolerance and more reliable components tend to generate low 
charges, and vice versa. For network operators, although 
increasing component reliability levels, achieved by reducing 
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failure rate and restored time, can increase nodal reliability 
levels and thereafter reduce nodal charges, the costs to deliver 
the actions could be enormous. For network users, they would 
see lower charges if they can tolerate greater load loss, but the 
loss due to energy interruption could increase in turn. 
Whatever decisions they make, the tradeoff between gains and 
costs should be carefully examined. 
VIII.  DISCUSSION 
In network pricing, it is important to respect the investment 
costs for maintaining network security and reliability. 
Generally, there are two types of methodologies used to 
calculate network reliability: Simulation based and analytical 
approach based [28, 29, 31, 32] and this paper uses analytical 
approaches in integrating reliability into network pricing. In 
order to fully reflect reliability related investment costs, the 
proposed approach has to run contingency analysis to examine 
how nodal injections would affect components’ reinforcement 
under contingency situations. The existing distribution system 
analysis software packages, such as PSS/E, Digsilent, and 
ETAP, have the ability to run network contingency and 
reliability analysis [30, 33]. Further, through the use of Python, 
extensive reliability and contingency analyses can be 
automated under the professional software environment such 
as PSS/E. The obtained results can be easily fed into this new 
pricing model to calculate nodal charges.  
IX.  CONCLUSION 
In order to reflect the cost of network security in network 
charging, this paper, for the first time, incorporates nodal 
unreliability tolerance and the supply component’s reliability 
into a distribution network charging model. It works by 
reflecting how a component’s failure rate and mean time to 
repair would affect its ability to deliver energy to customers, 
and how customers’ tolerance to supply interruption under 
contingencies will impact the component’s time to reinforce. 
Based on the analysis in the paper, the following observations 
can be obtained: 
 The proposed model overcomes two disadvantages of the 
existing pricing models: i) relying on deterministic criteria 
to reflect the cost of network security; and ii) unable to 
respect the nodal unreliability tolerance. It works by 
incorporating both factors into assessing the impact of a 
nodal perturbation on assets’ investment horizons. The new 
model can better reflect the actual network planning 
practice and the stochastic features of network failures. 
 Component reliability, allowed nodal load loss and the 
failure duration are the three major factors influencing 
nodal reliability. The new model reduces the nodal charges 
by considering them: more reliable components and larger 
unreliability tolerance lead to smaller charges, and vice 
versa.  
 The new model maintains the merits of the original LRIC 
model of being able to produce locational and cost-
reflective charges to influence prospective users’ behaviors 
to maximize the utilization of the existing networks, 
particularly those with higher reliability level and shorter 
time to repair.  
 One problem with the new model is that it would need 
substantial computational effort to analyze network 
contingencies for large-scale systems. We ran the proposed 
model on a practical EHV distribution network in the UK, 
comprising 1,898 busbars: it took the original LRIC method  
approximately 30 minutes to calculate charges for all load 
busbars but the proposed approach about 27 hours. 
Although it is a 50 fold increase in time, network charges 
are calculated on an annual basis and thus such an increase 
in running time is affordable by network operators to better 
reflect their investment decisions. Besides, the advance in 
computational techniques can benefit the application of the 
proposed method.  
Future research needs to investigate the correlation between 
nodal charges, the costs of different reliability improvement 
strategies, and how customers might respond to the locationl 
charges so as to find the economic equilibrium for both 
network operators and users. Additionally, the benefits in 
network investment deferral brought about by renewable 
generators are not considered in distribution network pricing in 
the UK currently, due to their output intermittency. Future 
work can also be conducted to examine how it would be more 
cost-effective to charge them, respecting the impact that they 
not only can bring forward network reinforcement but also 
might defer the needed network investment.  
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